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THE TRANSFER OF SENTENCED
PERSONS - COMMENTS ON THE
RELEVANT COUNCIL OF EUROPE
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Ekkehart Mtiller-Rappardt
I. INTRODUCTION
The transfer of sentenced persons is one of the legal devices
developed by the Council of Europe over the last thirty years to
address the enforcement of foreign criminal judgments.1 Under
this mechanism of European interstate co-operation, a person
sentenced and detained in a foreign country may be transferred
to a second country, usually the prisoner's state of origin, to
serve his sentence. Under the lexicon used by the Council of Eu-
rope, the two involved countries are referred to as the "sentenc-
ing state" and the "administering state,"2 respectively.
There are various arguments in favor of transfers. For in-
stance, there is the assumption made by relatives and friends
that imprisonment abroad entails particular hardships that are
to be avoided as much as possible for purely humanitarian rea-
t M.I.A., J.D., LL.M., head of the Council of Europe's Division on Crime Problems
from 1980 to 1988 (any personal views expressed herein are those of the author).
' See generally 3 E. MOLLER-RAPPARD & K. BASSIOUNI, EUROPEAN INTER-STATE CO-
OPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS (1987) (presents a collection of the relevant recommen-
dations and conventions). The transfer of sentenced persons is analyzed in E. Maller-
Rappard, La Convention europ~enne sur la valeur internationale des jugements repres-
sifs, in LE JURISTE SUISSE FACE AU DROIT ET AUX JUGEMENTS tkTRANG'.RS 227-47 (1988)
[hereinafter LE JURISTE].
The administering state is defined as: "the State to which the sentenced person
may be, or has been, transferred in order to serve his sentence." Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, art. 1(d), T.I.A.S. No. 10824. Further clar-
ification is provided in Article 3: "A sentenced person may be transferred under this
Convention only on the following conditions: (a) if that person is a national of the ad-
ministering State." Concomitantly, the Convention's explanatory report implicitly de-
fines the administering state as the sentenced person's "home" state. Council of Europe,
Explanatory Report on the Convention of the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, 8 (1983).
See infra text accompanying note 26.
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sons. There also remains the belief, especially in quarters not
much impressed by recidivism rates, that if an inmate is eventu-
ally to be returned or expelled to his state of origin or of perma-
nent residence, the inmate should serve his sentence there. It is
suggested that serving the sentence in the administering state
from the outset may facilitate or even accelerate the preparation
of the prisoner's release and social rehabilitation. Additionally,
although this argument is not usually stated bluntly, it is a fact
that imprisonment is quite costly and many prisons are cur-
rently overcrowded. Moreover, foreign prisoners are often diffi-
cult to handle by prison administrators.' When a state's foreign
prisoners outnumber the state's nationals imprisoned abroad,
costs and disciplinary hardships weaken the wish to invariably
punish the offender in the state where the crime was committed.
In short, a busy prison administration will readily give up the
difficult foreign crowd, provided the prisoner does not go free
once abroad. However, crime policy and public order considera-
tions may surface in particular cases where public outcry or pro-
test by the victims is feared.
Notwithstanding arguments in favor of transfers, the sen-
tencing state will certainly wish to be assured that the adminis-
tering state will enforce the original sentence, at least in princi-
ple. In this light, transfers are more a matter of mutual trust
than of comparative sentencing enforcement policy. Assuming
this principle of mutual trust to be true, the importance of fi-
nancial considerations, apparent at first blush, are weaker argu-
ments for cooperation.
Under the international legal mechanisms of the Council of
Europe, the transfer of a sentenced person depends on the fol-
lowing: i) whether the sentencing state is entitled to insist on the
transfer, i.e. whether the administering state is bound to accept
it under certain conditions; ii) who among the sentencing state,
the sentenced person or the administering state should be enti-
tled to initiate the procedure; and iii) whether consent to the
transfer by the sentenced person is of any relevance. The weight
given to these considerations in successive transfer conventions
See, e.g., Explanatory Memorandum of the Committee of the Ministers to Mem-
ber States Concerning Foreign Prisoners, Recommendation No. R(84) at 12, 25-26
(1985).
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has shifted over the years to reflect the changing goals of the
Council of Europe.
II. DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
SENTENCES
The European approach to the transfer of sentenced per-
sons has changed over the years. At an earlier stage, inter-state
co-operation in criminal matters was arranged solely between
the states concerned. Under a co-operation agreement, for exam-
ple, the sentenced person was merely an object of such co-opera-
tion and had no say regarding his transfer. The European Con-
vention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments
(Validity Convention) of 28 May, 1970 reflects this view.4 It
gives the sentencing state the exclusive right to request a trans-
fer 5 and obligates the requested administering state, under cer-
tain circumstances, to accept the request."
European Convention on the International Validity of Criminal Judgments, May
28, 1970, 973 U.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter the Validity Convention]. This convention entered
into force on 26 July 1974 and at present binds seven states. The contracting states that
are members of the Council of Europe, in order of ratification, are: Denmark, Sweden,
Cyprus, Norway, Turkey, Austria and the Netherlands. There are no contracting non-
member states.
5 The exclusive right of the sentencing state to request a transfer is subject to sev-
eral conditions.
The sentencing State may request another Contracting State to enforce the sanc-
tion only if one or more of the following conditions are fulfilled:
(a) if the person sentenced is ordinarily resident in the other State;
(b) if the enforcement of the sanction in the other State is likely to improve
the prospects for the social rehabilitation of the person sentenced;
(c) if, in the case of a sanction involving deprivation of liberty, the sanction
could be enforced following the enforcement of another sanction involving depri-
vation of liberty which the person sentenced is undergoing or is to undergo in the
other State;
(d) if the other State is the State of origin of the person sentenced and has
declared itself willing to accept responsibility for the enforcement of that sanction;
(e) if it considers that it cannot itself enforce the sanction, even by having
recourse to extradition, and that the other State can.
Validity Convention, supra note 4, at art. 5.
' There are several circumstances under which the requested administering state
could refuse to enforce the sanction or sentence.
Enforcement requested in accordance with the foregoing provisions may not be
refused, in whole or in part, save:
(a) where enforcement would run counter to the fundamental principles of
the legal system of the requested State;
(b) where the requested State considers the offence for which the sentence
1991]
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Article 44 of this Convention contains a characteristic com-
promise regarding the enforcement of sanctions pronounced in
the sentencing state: while the administering state could not ag-
gravate the sentence, it could, following a process of adaptation,
as in an exequatur procedure, impose a milder sanction than
that imposed in the sentencing state.$ For example, the adminis-
tering state may substitute a fine for incarceration. According to
the Convention's explanatory report, such a right "corresponds
to developments in modern criminal law."9 Unless there is genu-
was passed to be of a political nature or a purely military one;
(c) where the requested State considers that there are substantial grounds for
believing that the sentence was brought about or aggravated by considerations of
race, religion, nationality or political opinion;
(d) where enforcement would be contrary to the international undertakings of
the requested State;
(e) where the act is already the subject of proceedings in the requested State
or where the requested State decides to institute proceedings in respect of the act;
(f) where the competent authorities in the requested State have decided not
to take proceedings or to drop proceedings already begun, in respect of the same
act;
(g) where the act was committed outside the territory of the requesting State;
(h) where the requested State is unable to enforce the sanction;
(i) where the request is grounded on Article 5(e) and none of the other condi-
tions mentioned in .that article is fulfilled;
(i) where the requested State considers that the requesting State is itself able
to enforce the sanction;
(k) where the age of the person sentenced at the time of the offence was such
that he could not have been prosecuted in the requested State;
(1) where under the law of the requested State the sanction imposed can no
longer be enforced because of the lapse of time;
(rn) where and to the extent that the sentence imposes a disqualification.
Id. at art. 6. In addition, Article 7 mandates: "A request for enforcement shall not be
complied with if enforcement would run counter to the principles recognised in the pro-
visions of Section 1 or Part III of this Convention." Id. at art. 7.
"In determining the sanction, the court shall not aggravate the penal situation of
the person sentenced as it results from the decision delivered in the requesting State."
Id. at art. 44.1.
' If the request for enforcement is accepted, the court shall substitute for the
sanction involving deprivation of liberty imposed in the requesting State a sanc-
tion prescribed by its own law for the same offence. This sanction may, subject to
the limitations laid down in paragraph 2, be of a nature or duration other than
that imposed in the requesting State. If this latter sanction is less than the mini-
mum which may be pronounced under the law of the requested State, the court
shall not be bound by that minimum and shall impose a sanction corresponding to
the sanction imposed in the requesting State.
Id. at art. 44.1.
' Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the European Convention on the In-
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/6
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ine mutual trust, however, a sentencing state will refrain from
requesting enforcement by the administering state for fear that
the sanction substituted by the latter might no longer corre-
spond to the reprehensive character of the offence as recognized
in the original judgment. 10
More recently, it has been argued that the sentenced per-
son's view about his transfer should be taken into account be-
cause his transfer aims principally at giving him a better chance
of resocialization in the administering state. Thus, on 14 June
1979 the Council of Europe responded. Its Committee of Minis-
ters recommended that the governments of the contracting par-
ties "take . . . all appropriate steps to ensure that in the case of
a sanction involving deprivation of liberty the person sentenced
is granted the opportunity to express his view before a final de-
cision . . . is taken."11
III. THE TRANSFER CONVENTION OF 1983
The Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons
(Transfer Convention)," which was opened for signature on 21
March 1983, further advanced the notion of prisoner consent.
The Transfer Convention entered into force on 1 July 1985 and
binds fourteen member states of the Council of Europe, 3 as well
as two non-member states.1 4 It makes a sentenced person's con-
sent one of the basic elements of the transfer mechanism and
converts the transfer into a tripartite agreement. 5 Prisoner con-
ternational Validity of Criminal Judgments, 68 (1970) [hereinafter Explanatory Re-
port to the Validity Convention].
" See, LE JURISTE, supra note 1, at 238. It might be noted that, according to the
Convention's explanatory report, article 5 (Validity Convention, supra note 4) precludes
a request for transfer based solely on the sentencing state's desire to avoid enforcing a
judgment passed by its own authorities. Explanatory Report to the Validity Conven-
tion, supra note 9, at 30.
11 European Convention on the International Validity of Foreign Judgments, Rec-
ommendation No. R(79) 13, I, 2b (1979).
12 Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 1983, T.I.A.S. No.
10824 [hereinafter Transfer Convention].
"s The member states to the Transfer Convention are Austria, Cyprus, Denmark,
Finland, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
" The non-member states to the Transfer Convention are Canada and the United
States of America.
5 "A sentenced person may be transferred under this Convention only . . . if the
1991]
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sent is critical to the Transfer Convention because one of the
primary purposes of the Convention is to facilitate the rehabili-
tation of offenders16 and because the drafters presume that
"transferring a prisoner without his consent would be counter-
productive in terms of rehabilitation. ' 17 Yet this kind of sweep-
ing presumption may surely be questioned on its underlying
logic. Why should a person whose views were not sought as to
whether and when he is to go to prison be entitled to give or
refuse his consent as to where he is to be imprisoned? Assuming
that a foreign prisoner can be rehabilitated at all" and that re-
habilitation will be achieved best in his state of origin or perma-
nent residence,1 9 why should he be allowed to refuse his transfer
transfer is consented to by the sentenced person or . . . by the sentenced person's legal
representative .. " Transfer Convention, supra note 12, art. 3.1.d.
"0 The purposes of the Transfer Convention are set forth in its preamble as follows:
The member States of the Council of Europe and the other States, signatory
hereto,
Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve a greater
unity between its Members;
Desirous of further developing international co-operation in the field of crimi-
nal law;
Considering that such co-operation should further the ends of justice and the
social rehabilitation of sentenced persons;
Considering that these objectives require that foreigners who are deprived of
their liberty as a result of their commission of a criminal offence should be given
the opportunity to serve their sentences within their own society; and
Considering that this aim can best be achieved by having them transferred to
their own countries,
Have agreed as follows ...
Transfer Convention, supra note 12, preamble.
" Council of Europe, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Transfer of
Sentenced Persons, T 23 (1983) [hereinafter Explanatory Report to the Transfer
Convention].
"8 Doubts as to whether resocialization in a prison environment is at all possible
were expressed, inter alia, in the Gronigen Report of the Dutch Ministry of Justice, The
Hague, 1987, at 46:
[i]t is extremely difficult to create guarantees that persons placed in a situation of
a fundamental lack of liberty will change so essentially as to behave quite better
when they eventually return to their own surrounding. In any event, greater ma-
turity (or only age) still seems to be the best form of resocialization.
Id.
" The assumption that rehabilitation will best be achieved in the prisoner's state of
origin is indeed the official basis of both the Validity Convention (see Validity Conven-
tion, supra note 4, preamble) and the Transfer Convention (see cited provision supra
note 16). (See also Explanatory Report to the Transfer Convention, supra note 17, 9).
This makes it all the more surprising that these Conventions reflect almost opposite con-
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/6
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to a prison in that state? Finally, why should one assume that
his rehabilitation in that state will be at stake if he were trans-
ferred without his consent?
Whatever its justification in terms of penological philosophy
or human rights policy, the subordination of the transfer to the
sentenced person's consent is the most striking characteristic of
the 1983 Transfer Convention and has important consequences.
A sentenced person may request a transfer either of the sentenc-
ing state or the administering state.20 Moreover, with a view to
enabling a sentenced person to express his interest, he or she
must be informed of the Convention's substance by the sentenc-
ing state.2 Further, once the sentenced person has expressed an
interest to either the sentencing or the administering state, he or
she must be informed in writing of any action or decision taken
by either state on the request for transfer.22 Lastly, the sentenc-
ing state must ensure that the sentenced person consents "vol-
untarily and with full knowledge of the legal consequences
thereof'2 and that the administering state is allowed to verify
that this condition has been met.2'
clusions regarding the weight to be afforded the sentenced person's consent to, or refusal
of, his transfer.
20 "To that end, he may express his interest to the sentencing State or to the ad-
ministering State in being transferred under this Convention." Transfer Convention,
supra note 12, art. 2.2.
2 "If the sentenced person has expressed an interest to the sentencing State in be-
ing transferred under this Convention, that State shall so inform the administering State
as soon as practicable after the judgment becomes final." Id. at art. 4.2. "If the sentenced
person has expressed his interest to the administering State, the sentencing State shall,
on request, communicate to that State the information referred to in paragraph 3
above." Id. at art. 4.4. The arrangements for informing foreign prisoners of the text of
the Convention in a language they understand are provided in the Convention on the
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Recommendation No. R(84) 11 (1984) [hereinafter Rec-
ommendation R(84)].
" "The sentenced person shall be informed, in writing, of any action taken by the
sentencing State or the administering State under the preceding paragraphs, as well as of
any decision taken by either State on a request for transfer." Transfer Convention, supra
note 12, art. 4.5.
23 The pertinent provision of the Transfer Convention states, in part:
The sentencing State shall ensure that the person required to give consent to the trans-
fer in accordance with Article 3.1.d does so voluntarily and with full knowledge of the
legal consequences thereof. The procedure for giving such consent shall be governed by
the law of the sentencing State.
Id. at art. 7.1.
4 "The sentencing State shall afford an opportunity to the administering State to
1991]
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The condition that both the sentencing state and the ad-
ministering state agree to the transfer 25 constitutes a second
characteristic of the 1983 Transfer Convention. Because "[t]he
purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the transfer of foreign
prisoners to their home countries by providing a procedure
which is simple as well as expeditious,"2'  the Transfer Conven-
tion confines itself to providing the procedural framework for
transfers.27 In fact, it imposes only one rather general obligation
on the party states: "the Parties undertake to afford each other
the widest measure of co-operation in respect of the transfer of
sentenced persons .... "28 Either state may request the trans-
fer, but neither is under any obligation to comply with such a
request 2 -even if the sentenced person has given his consent
and all the other conditions for transfer are fulfilled. ° As there
verify, through a consul or other official agreed upon with the administering State, that
the consent is given in accordance with the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above." Id.
at art. 7.2.
20 "A sentenced person may be transferred under this Convention only .. .if the
sentencing and administering States agree to the transfer." Id. at art. 3.1.f.
26 Explanatory Report to the Transfer Convention, supra note 17, 8.
27 The Convention confines itself to providing the procedural framework for
transfers. It does not contain an obligation on Contracting States to comply with a
request for transfer; for that reason, it was not necessary to list any grounds for
refusal, nor to require the requested state to give reasons for its refusal to agree to
a requested transfer.
Id. at 10.
28 Transfer Convention, supra note 12, art. 2.1.
2 For this reason it is surprising that Article 4.2 of the Transfer Convention pro-
vides that when a sentenced person expresses an interest in being transferred, the sen-
tencing state "shall so inform the administering State as soon as practicable . . . "
(Transfer Convention, supra note 12). Such an obligation may seem unnecessary since
the sentencing state may reject the administering state's request for transfer at a later
stage, and without giving any reasons. "The requested State shall promptly inform the
requesting State of its decision whether or not to agree to the requested transfer." Id. at
art. 5.4. Moreover, the latter is under no obligation to make a request in the case of
repatriation of one of its own nationals.
30 The remaining conditions for transfer are:
a. if that person is a national of the administering State;
b. if the judgment is final;
c. if, at the time of receipt of the request for transfer, the sentenced person
still has at least six months of the sentence to serve or if the sentence is
indeterminate;
d. if the transfer is consented to by the sentenced person or, where in view of
his age or his physical or mental condition one of the two States considers it nec-
essary, by the sentenced person's legal representative;
e. if the acts or omissions on account of which the sentence has been imposed
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/6
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is no obligation to comply with a request, the Transfer Conven-
tion does not include a list of grounds for refusal, nor does it
require the requested state to give reasons for refusing to agree
to a requested transfer.3' Although confining the Transfer Con-
vention to a procedural mechanism that merely requires consen-
sus may have been the prevailing goal of the drafters, practice
has shown that it would be useful if refusals to comply with a
request for transfer were accompanied by an explanation, if only
to avoid repeating similar requests in the future.2
A third legal novum in the Transfer Convention of 1983, as
compared with the Convention of 1970," is the option" offered
to the administering state of either "continued enforcement"35
constitute a criminal offence according to the law of the administering State or
would constitute a criminal offence if committed on its territory.
Id. at art. 3.1.
" See provisions cited supra note 27.
32 Concerning the practical application of the Transfer Convention, Recommenda-
tion No. R(88) 13, which the Committee of Ministers adopted on 22 September 1988,
proposes solutions to a whole range of other difficulties which have arisen in practice.
The organizational and practical measures suggested in this Recommendation include:
setting up procedures for the effective handling of transfer requests; circulating a list of
officials responsible for the practical application of the Transfer Convention; introducing
target dates for the processing of cases; using the widest possible modern means of tele-
communication to inform the sentenced person of all relevant details of the expected
effects of his transfer; broadly defining the term "national" (Transfer Convention, supra
note 12, art. 3.4); and searching for other solutions if the choice of the enforcement pro-
cedure (Id. at art. 3.3) hampers the functioning of the transfer mechanism between the
parties concerned. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Recommendation
No. R(88) 13 (1988).
33 Validity Convention, supra note 4.
" The competent authorities of the administering State shall:
a. continue the enforcement of the sentence immediately or through a court or
administrative order, under the conditions set out in article 10, or
b. convert the sentence, through a judicial or administrative procedure, into a
decision of that State, thereby substituting for the sanction imposed in the sen-
tencing State a sanction prescribed by the law of the administering State for the
same offence, under the conditions set out in Article 11.
Transfer Convention, supra note 12, art. 9.1.
1* 1. In the case of continued enforcement, the administering State shall be
bound by the legal nature and duration of the sentence as determined by the sen-
tencing State.
2. If, however, this sentence is by its nature or duration incompatible with the
law of the administering State, or its law so requires, that State may, by a court or
administrative order, adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed
by its own law for a similar offence. As to its nature, the punishment or measure
shall, as far as possible, correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be en-
9
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or "conversion" 3 6 of the original sentence. In this respect, the
administering state must, if requested, inform the sentencing
state as to which of these procedures it will follow before it
transfers the sentenced person.3 7 The administering state may
also indicate, at the time of signature or when depositing its in-
strument of ratification, that it intends to omit either of these
procedures."s
IV. SOME DIFFICULT QUESTIONS AND PROSPECTS OF SOLUTIONS
In order to provide the transfer mechanism with needed
flexibility, provisions allow for a choice between continued en-
forcement and conversion of sentence. However, this flexibility
presents the possibility that each state will opt for a different
enforcement procedure, thus rendering the Convention ineffec-
tive by paralyzing the transfer mechanism. Indeed, if a sentenc-
ing state has excluded the conversion of sentence and if an ad-
forced. It shall not aggravate, by its nature or duration, the sanction imposed in
the sentencing State, nor exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of the ad-
ministering State.
Id. at art. 10.
" In the case of conversion of sentence, the procedures provided for by the law
of the administering State apply. When converting the sentence, the competent
authority:
a. shall be bound by the findings as to the facts insofar as they appear explicitly
or implicitly from the judgment imposed in the sentencing State;
b. may not convert a sanction involving deprivation of liberty to a pecuniary
sanction;
c. shall deduct the full period of deprivation of liberty served by the sentenced
person; and
d. shall not aggravate the penal position of the sentenced person, and shall not
be bound by any minimum which the law of the administering State may provide
for the offence or offences committed.
Id. at art. 11.1.
" "The administering State, if requested, shall inform the sentencing State before
the transfer of the sentenced person as to which of these procedures it will follow." Id. at
art. 9.2.
Article 3.3 gives the administering state express permission to forego one of the
procedures. It provides as follows:
Any State may, at the time of signature or when depositing its instrument of rati-
fication, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration addressed to the Sec-
retary General of the Council of Europe, indicate that it intends to exclude the
application of one of the procedures provided in Article 9.1.a and b in its relations
with other Parties.
Id. See provisions cited supra note 34.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol3/iss1/6
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ministering state has excluded continued enforcement, there can
be no transfer under the terms of this Convention between these
two countries. They will be forced to enter into supplemental,
bilateral agreements or make ad hoc arrangements if there is to
be any transfer at all!
Are other unforeseen legal complications posed? Is the lack
of speedy replies to requests for transfers, which is often com-
plained of in practice, a genuine reason to doubt the success of
this Convention? What is the actual impact of the provision re-
quiring that a sentenced person be transferred only "if that per-
son is a national of the administering State,"39 when millions of
Europeans reside in countries whose passport they do not hold?
In other words, is it true that most contracting states have
availed themselves of the opportunity under Article 3.4 to define
the term "national" in a broad sense, so as to include any close
ties the sentenced person may have with the administering
state? What about the improvement brought by this Convention
in providing that, in the case of conversion of sentence, the ad-
ministering state "may not convert a sanction involving depriva-
tion of liberty to a pecuniary sanction"?40 How could the sen-
tenced person, prior to consenting to transfer, be better
informed of the likelihood of sentence in the administering state,
which is a matter of real concern to most foreign prisoners?
What is the effect of the administering state's obligation to pro-
vide certain information to the sentencing state concerning the
enforcement of the sentence?4'
Any attempt at a definitive reply to these and many more
questions42 would seem rather hazardous at present. The fact re-
Id. at art. 3.1.a.
Id. at art. ll.l.b.
41 The administering State shall provide information to the sentencing State
concerning the enforcement of the sentence:
a. when it considers enforcement of the sentence to have been completed;
b. if the sentenced person has escaped from custody before enforcement of
the sentence has been completed; or
c. if the sentencing State requests a special report.
Id. at art. 15.
42 See, LE JURISTE, supra note 1, at 246-47. For a comprehensive examination of all
provisions and innovations of this Convention, see H. Bartsch, Strafvollstreckung im
Heimatstaat, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT (Deutscher Anwaltuerein) 513-17
(1984) and Bolle, Presentation de la Convention sur le transfrement des personnes
condamn~es du 21 mars 1983, INFORMATIONS PPNITENTIAIRES suissEs 207-14 April, 1983.
1991]
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mains, however, that the system seems to work and those who
are called upon to apply this system seem very eager to improve
it."3 Effective enforcement of the Transfer Convention ulti-
mately depends on the readiness of government officials to trust
the penal system of other countries and on the willingness of
governments to co-operate as quickly and effectively as possible.
'3 As evidenced by the preparation and adoption of the Recommendation on the
practical application of the Transfer Convention. See, e.g., Recommendation No. R (84),
supra note 21.
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